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.E¢ ciency in Decentralized Oligopolistic Markets
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November 2014
Abstract: The paper analyses quantity competition in economies in which a network describes
the set of feasible trades. A model is presented in which the identity of buyers, of sellers, and
of intermediaries is endogenously determined by the trade ows in the economy. The analysis
rst considers small economies, and provides su¢ cient conditions for equilibrium existence,
a characterization of prices and ows, and some negative results relating welfare to network
structure. The second and central part of the analysis considers behavior in large markets,
and presents necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the network structure for equilibria to be
approximately e¢ cient when the number of players is large.
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1 Introduction
Classical models of competition rely on the anonymity of markets to explain prices and trade.
According to this view, exchanges in an economy take place in centralized markets and the
identity of players has no e¤ect on prices and terms of trade. Recent models of decentralized
competition depart from such a stark paradigm by considering markets in which exchanges take
place in bilateral relationships. Prices and outcomes in such economies crucially depend on the
set of feasible trades and on the implied market power. Results to date have mainly focused on
economies in which the identity of buyers and sellers is exogenously determined, and in which
only trade from sellers to buyers are feasible. This study analyzes decentralized oligopolistic
markets in which the role of players in the economy is determined in equilibrium, and presents
conditions on the structure of an economy for trade to be almost e¢ cient when the number of
players is large.
The paper introduces a static model of decentralized oligopolistic trade for economies in
which a network describes the set of feasible trading relationships. In the model, individuals
choose their supply to neighboring players, correctly anticipating that the equilibrium price
for a trade will be given by a buyers marginal value. Since trade a¤ects the marginal rate
of substitution of both players involved in a transaction, supply decisions inuence both the
price at which goods are purchased and the price at which they are sold. Traders maximize
their private utility, taking into account how their supply decisions a¤ect prices. The resulting
ow of goods endogenously determines whether an individual buys, sells, or does both based
on preferences, production possibilities and the position held in the network. That is, supply
chains arise endogenously in this model. Intermediation and signicant price dispersion are
generic phenomena in small or poorly connected economies.
When the number of players is small, trade is necessarily ine¢ cient because of the price
distortions implied by quantity competition. However, when the number of players is large,
simple conditions can be imposed on an economy to ensure that trade is approximately ef-
cient. To study large markets with a xed topology, the analysis introduces the notion of
community structure of a trade network. Communities consist of subsets of players who share
the same potential trade partners in the economy. For instance, when the network captures
the geography of an economy, a community identies the subset of players at a given geograph-
ical location. The analysis of large markets xes the community structure and considers what
happens when the number of players in some communities is large. Even when communities
are large, trade between communities and intermediation may still be required to support an
e¢ cient allocation. Our main result establishes that trade is almost e¢ cient if and only if
it is possible to clear markets without recourse to intermediation in any large community. If
so, direct competition among players belonging to neighboring large communities eliminates
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resale and restores e¢ ciency. In contrast, when intermediation is required to implement the
e¢ cient allocation, players mediating trade necessarily command a rent and distort trade, as
their supply decisions a¤ect feasible outcomes. If so, trade remains ine¢ cient even when an
economy is arbitrarily large.
The rst part of the analysis develops baseline results for economies in which the number
of players is small. It presents: su¢ cient conditions for pure strategy equilibrium existence; a
characterization equilibrium prices, ows and markups; and some negative results on welfare. A
key feature of the outow model is that resale markups are strictly positive due to the double-
marginalization problem faced by players acting as intermediaries. Thus, goods never cycle
in equilibrium, and not all linked players with di¤erent marginal rates of substitution elect to
trade. Individuals would never purchase units previously sold, because a higher price would
have to be paid; and individuals with low willingness to pay might prefer not to sell their goods,
as trade might increase the price paid on the units purchased.1 Equilibrium behavior involves
price discrimination across locations of the trade network. Intermediation arises both because
of the scarcity of trading partners and because of the di¤erent prices that prevail throughout
the economy in equilibrium.
Results on welfare rst establish that trade is always ine¢ cient in economies populated by
nitely many players, and then present some negative conclusions relating welfare to network
structure. Adding trading relationships does not necessarily improve social welfare in these
markets, as more goods may ow to low value markets when sellers price discriminate locations
in which the goods are most desired. More surprisingly, even though players have the option
not to trade with any one of their neighbors, the welfare of an individual may decline when
the number of players in his neighborhood increases. Since trading relationships are common
knowledge, whenever new links raise the demand of an individual, price discrimination by his
suppliers may decrease the amount of goods sold to him and consequently his welfare.
The second part of the analysis studies behavior in economies with a large number of players.
It considers economies in which players are of nitely many types and are positioned at nitely
many locations connected by a network. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions are presented
for trade to be almost e¢ cient when the number of players in every community is large. Any
economy in which intermediation is required to clear markets, is ine¢ cient independently of the
size and structure of the market. Intermediaries necessarily command a rent whenever they are
needed to distribute goods, and competition among them can reduce, but not eliminate resale
markups. E¢ cient trade in such markets is equivalent to the existence of ows of goods that are
both direct and e¢ cient. Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of such ows are
derived. These conditions are analogous to market clearing requirements for two-sided markets,
1This implication di¤ers from that of the Cournot model in which any two players with di¤erent marginal
rates of substitution always elect to trade.
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and require the aggregate demand of any subset of communities not to exceed the aggregate
supply of communities with whom direct trade is feasible. Equilibrium outcomes can be fully
characterized even when the conditions for e¢ ciency fail. In such instances, intermediation
and distortions persist even when the number of players at every location is arbitrarily large.
Similar results are developed for economies in which only a subset of communities is large.
E¢ cient trade in large communities is again equivalent to the existence of direct and e¢ cient
ows of goods between those communities. E¢ ciency in small communities further requires
that players in those locations be able to directly trade in some large market. Results also
establish that social welfare converges monotonically to e¢ ciency when all communities grow
large.
The analysis concludes by presenting an alternative quantity competition model in which
individuals decide how much to buy, and in which units are sold at marginal value. Similar
results hold, even though the distribution of rents di¤ers. More rents ow to buyers, and social
welfare is generally higher than when players choose how much to sell.
Literature Review: A vast recent literature has analyzed trade in buyer-seller networks.
Such models usually take the identity of buyers and sellers in an economy as an exogenous
characteristic of the market, and describe the set of feasible trades from sellers to buyers
with a network. These papers di¤er mainly in how competition is modelled. Kranton and
Minehart 2001 model competition among sellers as simultaneous ascending price auctions,
and studies the formation of e¢ cient link patterns. Corominas-Bosch 2004 models trade as a
centralized non-cooperative bargaining game, and provides su¢ cient conditions on the network
structure for the equilibrium of the bargaining game to coincide with the Walrasian outcome.
Ilkilic 2010 discusses market power in the context of a linear-quadratic quantity competition
model of two-sided markets. Lever 2010 analyses Bertrand competition between duopolists,
and the relationship between network structure and welfare. Several papers on decentralized
bargaining (Abreu and Manea 2012, Manea 2011, Polanski 2007, Polanski and Vega-Redondo
2013, Polanski andWinter 2010) also consider models of trade in two-sided markets, and analyze
e¢ ciency in such markets. All of these models however, rule out intermediation by assumption,
and implicitly set the identity of buyers and sellers as a primitive of the problem.
Other papers have introduced some notion of intermediation in the context of a two-sided
market. Blume, Easley, Kleinberg and Tardos 2007 study buyer-seller networks in which all
trades have to be mediated by price-setting middlemen. Equilibria in this setting always im-
plement an e¢ cient allocation, and middlemen command a positive rent if and only if they
possess an essential connection in the network structure. Siedlarek 2013 allows for more gen-
eral structures of intermediation in the context of a model of coalitional bargaining, and shows
that e¢ ciency obtains when no intermediary is essential. The e¢ ciency result however, relies
partly on exogeneity of sellers and buyers and partly on the centralized nature of the bargain-
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ing protocol considered. Manea 2014 has recently developed similar results in the context of
a decentralized bargaining model, and identied frictions that might arise in such models. A
related literature analyzes competition between owners of links on a network in which indi-
viduals selshly route ows (Chawla and Roughgarden 2007, Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007,
Choi Galeotti and Goyal 2014). This literature usually takes a Bertrand approach, and was
developed to model competition between internet providers pricing information streams.
The quantity competition model presented here di¤ers from the models discussed above, as
the roles of individuals in a supply chain are endogenously determined in equilibrium. Kakade,
Kerns and Orthiz 2004 characterizes the competitive equilibria of a general networked market
in which the roles of players are endogenous. However, price taking behavior implies that
network structure cannot directly a¤ect market power. Condorelli and Galeotti 2012 analyzes
sequential trade of a single unit in a general networked market in which there is some incomplete
information about the value of the good. In the model prices decrease along the supply chain
as trade reveals a low value for the good. This setting is closest in spirit to that of the current
paper. But due to the complications arising from incomplete information and dynamics, the
model remains stylized and does not deliver the results presented here.
The spirit of the analysis is close to the oligopoly and trade literature surveyed in Leahy and
Neary 2010, which provides motivation for developing a tractable model of oligopolistic general
equilibrium trade while highlighting the challenges posed by this exercise. Recent studies in
the matching literature have also addressed the problem of intermediation in decentralized
markets. Prime examples in this literature are Ostrovsky 2008, and Hateld and Kominers
2012. Although these studies are motivated by similar questions, di¤erences in the environment
and in the notion of equilibrium remain signicant. The framework analyzed is also evocative of
classical cooperative game theory results which analyze properties of core allocations in similar
environments, such as Kalai, Postlewaite & Roberts 1978.
Roadmap: Section 2 analyses outow competition. It presents the model, a characterization
of equilibrium prices and ows, and results for small economies. Section 3 discusses outow
competition in large economies, and presents conditions for e¢ ciency. Section 4 discusses inow
competition. Section 5 concludes. All proofs can be found in appendix.
2 Outow Competition
The section begins with a description of the economy and of the outow competition model,
and proceeds with results on equilibrium behavior and welfare in small economies.
The Economy and E¢ ciency
Consider an economy with a nite set of players, V , and two goods. For convenience, refer to
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the two goods as consumption q, and money m. Any player i in the economy can trade goods
only with a subset of players Vi  V nfig, which is called the neighborhood of Player i. Assume
that j 2 Vi if and only if i 2 Vj. This structure of interaction denes an undirected graph
G = (V;E) in which ij 2 E if and only if j 2 Vi. Refer to G as the trade network. Assume that
trade network is connected, as any component would act as a separate economy otherwise.2
Denote by qij the ow of consumption good from individual i to individual j. Since trade
can occur only between players that know each other, qij = 0 whenever ji =2 E. For any player
i, dene the total purchases and the total sales of consumption good respectively as
qi =
P
k2Vi q
k
i and q
i
 =
P
k2Vi q
i
k.
Let the net-trade of Player i be dened as the di¤erence between these two quantities, qi =
qi  qi, and let the resale of Player i be dened as the smallest among the two, ri = min fqi ; qig.
When an individual purchases more (fewer) units than those he sells, his resale consists of all
the units that he sells (buys). Bold letters are used to denote vectors of ows. In particular, qi
denotes the vector of consumption ows from i to his neighbors in Vi; q denotes the Cartesian
product of all the qis; and q i denotes the Cartesian product of qj for all j 6= i.
The utility of every individual in the economy is separable in the two goods, and linear in
money. In particular, Player is utility for a net-trade qi and an amount of money m simply
satises
ui(qi) +m.
The net-trade of any player i is bounded from below by a non-positive number  Qi. Refer
to Qi as the capacity of Player i. Since Qi > 0 is possible, players can sell more units,
than they purchase. This setup can capture both endowment and production economies. In
the production interpretation of the model,  ui(qi) can be viewed as the cost of supplying
 qi > 0 units to the market. Non-negativity constraints on monetary holdings are neglected
throughout the analysis. It is implicitly assumed that monetary endowments are su¢ ciently
large for such constraints never to bind. The following standard assumptions on payo¤s are
maintained throughout.
Assumption A1 For any player i 2 V , ui is three times continuously di¤erentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave on [ Qi;1).
For convenience, denote an economy by E = fV;G;Q;ug. For any prole of ows q 2 RE+,
social welfare is evaluated by the sum of payo¤s. Since the payo¤s are quasi-linear and monetary
endowments are large, any interior Pareto optimum maximizes the sum of the utilities of the
2A network is connected if for any i; k 2 V there exists an m tuple of players (j1; ::; ; jm) such that j1 = i,
jm = k, and jk+1 2 Vjk for all k = 1; 2:::;m   1. Any maximal connected subgraph of G is a component of G
(Bollobas 1998).
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non-linear good. As all trades can be executed when the network is connected, the denition
of e¢ ciency abstracts from the network structure and only identies welfare maximizing net-
trades.3
E¢ ciency: A prole of net-trades q 2 RV+ is e¢ cient for an economy E if it solves
q 2 arg maxq2RV
P
i2V ui(qi) s.t. qi   Qi for 8i 2 V .
Assumption A1 implies that e¢ cient net-trades exist, and that they would attain as a compet-
itive equilibrium in the corresponding centralized market.
Outow Competition
In the model of competition considered, the description of the economy is common knowledge.4
Players can only trade with their neighbors, and simultaneously decide how many units of
consumption to sell to each of them while being required not to sell more units than their
capacity Qi. As customary in quantity competition models, prices are determined so that
buyers pay all of the units purchased at their marginal value. In particular, the price paid
by Player i for units sold from a neighbor j is determined by is inverse demand curve for
consumption,
pji (q) = pi(qi) = u
0
i(qi) = u
0
i(q

i   qi). (1)
The proposed pricing mechanism could be micro-founded in the context of a two-stage model
in which suppliers rst commit to sales of consumption to known buyers, and then compete
on prices to supply these buyers. Indeed, if suppliers were able to commit to outows, and if
they were to compete on prices at each local market given their outow decisions, equation (1)
would still dictate pricing, since no supplier would benet from a unilateral deviation in the
price-setting game. Price reductions would not a¤ect the quantity sold as all units supplied are
sold, while price increases would reduce revenues because of falling sales. This observation was
rst made in Kreps and Scheinkman 1983 while studying Bertrand competition with quantity
commitment. Their results extend immediately to the outow framework, since no restrictions
were imposed on the number of buyers.5 Thus, pricing in the outow model captures behavior
in markets in which local supply decisions have to be made prior to competition.
The concavity of the utility function implies that the price paid by any player i decreases
3If the network had more than one component, e¢ ciency would also have to account for the infeasibility of
trade across components.
4The assumption is strong, but considerably simplies the analysis. It is plausible for environments in which
the network captures geographical or legal trade costs. It would be interesting to study a setup in which players
have incomplete information about the global network structure. The analysis presented here would apply only
to setups in which players hold correct beliefs about equilibrium net-trades at neighboring locations.
5The proposed two-stage model would always possess Subgame Perfect equilibria in which prices and ows
coincide with the Nash equilibria of the outow competition model.
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when his inows increase, increases when his outows increase, and is not directly a¤ected by
other ows in the economy. That is, @pi(qi)=@q
j
i < 0 and @pi(qi)=@q
i
j > 0 for any neighbor
j 2 Vi. When choosing their outows, sellers account for the distortions that their supply
decisions might induce both on the prices they receive for each unit sold and on the price they
pay for each unit bought. The welfare of an individual i given a prole of ows q is therefore
determined by the map,
wi(q) = ui(qi) +
P
k2Vi

pk(qk)q
i
k   pi(qi)qki

,
where prices are pinned down by equation (1), and where the summation denotes the trade
surplus of Player i. In what follows the expression outow equilibrium will be used to refer to
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the outow competition model.
Outow Equilibrium Flows q 2 RE+ constitute an outow equilibrium, if for any i 2 V ,
qi 2 arg max
yi2RVi+
wi(y
i;q i) s.t. yi  Qi.
The outow constraint qi  Qi requires total sales not exceed capacity, and is more demanding
than requiring net-trades to be bounded by capacity. The constraint implies that players cannot
resell units unless these can potentially be produced in house. Although the stronger restriction
is far from ideal in many applications, it has no e¤ect on the results and it is only imposed
for clarity, as it guarantees that action sets do not depend on the supply decisions of other
players. All of the conclusions presented (including those on existence) would also hold under
the weaker outow constraint qi   Qi. However, the model would cease to be a game as the
set of feasible actions would be determined in equilibrium by means of a xed point argument.
Outow Equilibrium Existence
The rst result presents su¢ cient conditions for outow equilibrium existence, and a characteri-
zation of equilibrium ows of consumption. Bounds are imposed on the slope and the curvature
of every demand function to guarantee that the payo¤ of every player remains well-behaved
(a standard assumption in imperfect competition models). Denote the elasticity of the inverse
demand curve of Player i with respect to quantity by i(q) =  (Qi + q)u00i (q)=u0i(q). Also,
denote Player is total cost of supplying outows and Player is revenue from suppling units to
market j 2 Vi respectively by
Ci(q
i;q i) =  ui(qi) + u0i(qi)qi ,
Rij(q
i
j;q
 i) = u0j(qj)q
i
j.
The total cost of supplying outows is determined by adding the cost of forgone net-trades
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 ui(qi) to the expenditure on inows u0i(qi)qi . The welfare of an individual can thus, be
expressed as the sum of the revenue made in each neighboring market, minus the total cost of
supplying such outows.
Consider the following constraints on the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand curve
with respect to quantity.
Assumption A2 For any player i 2 V , the utility ui satises at least one of the following two
conditions for any q >  Qi:
[B1]  (Qi + q)u000i (q)=u00i (q) 2 [ 1; 2];
[B2]  (Qi + q)u000i (q)=u00i (q) 2 [ i(q)=Vi; 2i(q)].
Assumption A2 is evocative of the su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a solution to the
monopoly problem, as it bounds the elasticity of demand from above.6 Conditions in A2 are
stronger however, as the elasticity must also be bounded from below when players are allowed
both to buy and to sell units.
The next result establishes that assumption A2 guarantees the existence of an outow
equilibrium, and characterizes the conditions identifying any outow equilibrium.
Proposition 1 If A1 and A2 hold, outow equilibria exist and coincide with the solutions (q;) 2
RE+  RV+ to the complementarity problem:
f ij(q;)q
i
j = 0 and f
i
j(q;) = u
0
i(qi)  u0j(qj)  u00j (qj)qij   u00i (qi)qi + i  0 for ij 2 E
fi(q;)i = 0 and fi(q;) = Qi   qi  0 for i 2 V .
Existence obtains because the set of feasible outows of every player is non-empty, convex
and compact, and because assumption A2 guarantees that best responses are continuous and
single-valued (and that Brouwers xed point theorem thus applies). In particular, condition
B1 requires revenues to be concave and total costs to be convex in any market; while condition
B2 requires total costs to be convex and revenues to be concave only when revenues increase
in a market. Either condition implies that best responses are single-valued, as the payo¤ of
every player is concave whenever increasing. Any combination of the bounds would also grant
existence, as the lowerbounds discipline only total costs, while the upperbounds only revenues.
It can be readily veried that common families of preferences meet the proposed conditions for
outow equilibrium existence.
Remark 2 An outow equilibrium exists if one of the following two conditions holds:
(a) ui(q) = i(Qi + q)
i for i 2 (0; 1) i 2 R++ any i 2 V ;
(b) ui(q) =  ie i(Qi+q) for i 2 R++ i 2 R++ any i 2 V .
6Classical monopoly requires the elasticity of inverse demand to be bounded above by 2.
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The second part of Proposition 1 characterizes outow equilibria as solutions to the system of
best responses (where i denotes the multiplier on the capacity constraint of Player i 2 V ).
When the outow constraint qi  Qi does not bind, the optimality of an interior outow qij > 0
simply requires that
pj(qj)  pi(qi) =  p0j(qj)qij   p0i(qi)qi .
If so, the markup on the ow qij (the di¤erence between price received and the marginal cost of
forgone consumption) is completely determined by two wedges: one distorts of the price paid by
Player j, while the other distorts the price paid by i for all inows purchased. The rst wedge
is due to the fact that i is a Cournot supplier of j, while the second wedge is due to the fact i is
a monopsonistic buyer at his location. Pricing behavior in the outow model favors suppliers
as the demand curve is used to clear each local market. Section 4 explores the consequences of
the alternative setup in which sellers own the trading location and in which buyers commit to
inows.
Four Player Examples
Before the formal discussion of outow equilibrium properties, consider a simple economy with
four players, labeled fa; b; c; dg. Let Qa = 5, Qb = 2, and Qc = Qd = 1=2, and assume
that preferences of every Player i satisfy ui(q) = (Qi + q)1=2. Throughout the examples,
for convenience, interpret Qi and Qi + qi respectively as the endowment and the equilibrium
consumption of Player i. If no trade takes place in the economy, social welfare is worth 5:06.
E¢ ciency instead, requires players to split the consumption good equally. Social welfare at this
allocation is maximal and equal to 5:66. Equal sharing however, is not an outow equilibrium
even when all trades are feasible. When the trade network is complete, in the unique outow
equilibrium Player a sells to all of his neighbors, and Player b resells some of the goods purchased
from a to c and d. Players c and d do not trade with each other since they are identical and in
a symmetric position.7 Equilibrium ows do not equalize marginal rates of substitutions. The
price paid by consumers c and d for each unit of consumption purchased is 0:41. This price
exceeds the price charged by consumer a to b on the units traded, 0:34. Even though a has the
option not to sell to his competitor, b, he prefers to do so, because it is protable, and because
it is impossible to prevent b from supplying the nal consumers, c and d. Thus, Player b is able
to impose a 21% markup on all the units that he resells. Equilibrium ows for this economy
are reported in the rst network of gure 1. Consumption, prices and welfare can be found in
the rst matrix of table 1. In equilibrium, consumers a and b curtail their supply to c and d
in order to maximize their gains from trade. The allocation is ine¢ cient and social welfare is
equal to 5:61.
7If the link cd were removed from the trade network, equilibrium ows and prices would not be a¤ected,
since no trade takes place between c and d.
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Figure 1: Flows in the four examples: on the vertices are endowments and identities and on
the edges are equilibrium ows and their direction.
Severing the link between players a and b surprisingly does not favor a by giving him the
opportunity to commit not to sell to b. When the link ab is removed from the trade network,
consumption of every player, except b, increases. The nal consumers, c and d, purchase more
goods at a lower price and are better o¤. But consumers a and b are worse o¤. The equilibrium
remains ine¢ cient, and social welfare decreases further to 5:59. The price paid by consumers c
and d for each unit of consumption purchased decreases to 0:4, and coincides with the Cournot
equilibrium price for the economy without a network. The second network in gure 1 and the
second matrix in table 1 describe the unique equilibrium of this economy.
p x w p x w p x w p x w
a - 2.84 2.53 a - 3.16 2.51 a - 3.15 2.53 a - 3.86 2.41
b 0.34 2.16 1.44 b - 1.72 1.42 b - 1.81 1.42 b - 1.83 1.42
c 0.41 1.50 0.82 c 0.40 1.56 0.83 c 0.39 1.62 0.83 c 0.39 1.65 0.87
d 0.41 1.50 0.82 d 0.40 1.56 0.83 d 0.42 1.42 0.80 d 0.62 0.66 0.71
+ - 8.00 5.61 + - 8.00 5.59 + - 8.00 5.58 + - 8.00 5.41
Table 1: Equilibrium prices paid, consumption x = Q+ q, and welfare for each player in the
four economies.
If the link between players b and d is also removed from the network, consumer d remains with
only a and c as potential suppliers, while consumer c can still purchase from both a and b. In
equilibrium, a and b still supply all of their neighbors. But, consumer c opts not to resell to d
despite having more consumption good than d, since selling to d would increase the price paid
on all the units purchased. In the outow model, linked players with di¤erent marginal rates of
substitution occasionally choose not to trade, as a commitment not to resell can signicantly
reduce the price paid on all the units purchased. The third network in gure 1 and the third
matrix in table 1 characterize the unique equilibrium of this economy. Since Player c has two
suppliers, while Player d has only one that is active, Player c pays a lower price for consumption
than d. Player a sells more units in the competitive market than in the one in which he is a
monopolist. Social welfare decreases further to 5:58. Finally, consider the economy in which
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all individuals can only trade with c. In such a market, players a and b sell to c who in turn
supplies d with some of the units purchased. The nal network in gure 1 and the nal matrix
in table 1 describe the unique equilibrium of this economy. Player cs markup on the units sold
to d amounts to 58%. Resale takes place despite the large intermediation rent. However, price
distortions constrain sales from Player c to Player d, as resale sharply increases the price paid
by Player c to his suppliers. Social welfare drops to 5:41. Consumers a and d are worse o¤,
while consumer c is better o¤ as he mediates any trade with d.
Outow Equilibrium Properties
Two sets of results are presented about outow equilibria in economies with a small number
of players. The rst addresses the properties of equilibrium ows and pricing, while the latter
presents several negative conclusions on welfare.
In the outow model, consumption ows from players with low marginal value to players
with high marginal value, as assumption A1 implies that qji > 0 only if u
0
j(qj) > u
0
i(qi). The
worst possible use of the goods owned is therefore consumption and not trade; and buyers are
never willing to pay more than their marginal value for the last unit purchased. Consumption
ows only in one direction on every link, and at most jEj =2 ows are positive in equilibrium.
Individuals sell, or resell, goods to their neighbors only if the gains from trade compensate
them both for the monopsony price distortion on inows and for the Cournot distortion on
outows. A positive di¤erence in marginal rates of substitution is therefore necessary, but not
su¢ cient for trade to take place among pairs of linked individuals. Small di¤erences in marginal
rates of substitution may not su¢ ce for trade to take place, as the monopsony distortion may
prevent trade between players who value consumption similarly. Equilibrium retail markups
are always strictly positive, as qi  ri > 0 implies that pj(qj) > pi(qi) even when qij is small.
Intermediation however, remains a common phenomenon because of the limited number of
trading relationships that can be used to transfer goods, and because of the sellersincentives to
price discriminate neighboring buyers. The latter motive explains why intermediation can take
place in equilibrium even when the trade network is complete. The next proposition summarizes
several useful properties of outow equilibria. For convenience, refer to an individual as a source
(sink) if he does not buy (sell) consumption.
Proposition 3 If A1 and A2 hold, in any outow equilibrium q:
(a) qij > 0 implies pj(qj) > pi(qi), and the converse may not hold;
(b) goods do not cycle and prices strictly increase along any supply chain;
(c) players with marginal utility lower (higher) than all their neighbors are sources (sinks);
(d) if unconstrained, sources sell to all their neighbors with strictly higher marginal utility;
(e) if i; j 2 Vk and pj(qj) > pi(qi), then i buys from k only if j buys from k.
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Part (a) follows from the previous discussion, and (b) is an immediate consequence of goods
being resold at strictly positive markups. In fact, because the marginal utility of consumption
strictly increases along any supply chain, it can never be that an individual buys units he
previously sold. Since goods do not cycle, ows of goods move from sources to sinks. Flows
however, may have more than one source and/or sink in equilibrium. Part (c) follows because
individuals with lower marginal utility than their neighbors would never buy, as only players
with lower marginal utility could supply them, and must therefore be sources. Similarly, indi-
viduals with higher marginal utility than their neighbors would never sell, and must therefore
be sinks. Part (d) shows why sources sell to every neighbor with higher marginal utility if the
outow constraint does not bind. If so, a positive di¤erence in marginal rates of substitution is
not only necessary, but also su¢ cient for trade to take place, because sources have no inows
and because outow price distortions vanish with outows. Part (e) nally, establishes that if
two players have a neighbor in common, that neighbor sells to the low marginal utility player
only if he sells to the high marginal utility player. Results in the web-appendix show that when
the network is complete, the ranking of marginal utilities coincides with the ranking of supply
costs.8
The next result exploits some of the properties of outow equilibria to derive several negative
conclusions on welfare. As before, evaluate social welfare by summing the welfare of each player
in the economy, P
i2V wi(q) =
P
i2V ui(qi).
Results establish that ine¢ ciencies are a common feature of the outow equilibrium model, and
show why adding links might have unexpected consequences on individual and social welfare.
Proposition 4 If A1 holds, the following conclusions apply for i; j 2 V :
(a) an e¢ cient outow equilibrium q exists if and only if q = 0 is e¢ cient;
(b) equilibrium social welfare in a network (V;E) can be higher than in a network (V;E [ ij);
(c) equilibrium welfare of i in a network (V;E) can be higher than in a network (V;E [ ij).
When trade is required to support the e¢ cient allocation, any outow equilibrium is necessarily
ine¢ cient, as price distortions curtail trade in any local market. If so, social welfare may
decline when new trading relationships are added to the network.9 A new trading link can
further distort the allocation of consumption, as prot maximization by sellers may reallocate
consumption from high to low value buyers. The payo¤ of a player can also decline when a new
trading partner is added to his neighborhood. If a new trading partner increases the marginal
8Complete networks guarantee that low marginal utility players sell more. However, without further discipline
on preferences it is impossible to guarantee that players with low marginal utilities also buy less from their
neighbors. Section 2 of the web-appendix presents su¢ cient conditions for this to be the case.
9A negative relationship between social welfare and network density obtains in numerous other studies, and
is often referred to as Braesss Paradox in the context of the networks literature.
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value of consumption of Player i (due to the option value of reselling units), players selling
to i might curtail their supply in order to extract some of the surplus generated in the new
relationship. If this e¤ect is su¢ ciently pronounced, Player is payo¤ declines in any outow
equilibrium when a new trading partner is added to his neighborhood.10
Welfare conclusions rely on the market power frictions implicit in any quantity competition
model. The main aim of the rest of the analysis is to provide conditions on the network structure
for such frictions to vanish when the number of players in the economy is large.
Comments on Outow Competition and Market Power: In the model presented, nodes
on a network were interpreted as separate local markets. Competitors used their access to dif-
ferent locations to price discriminate their customers. As discrimination within a local market
was ruled out by linear pricing, discriminating across markets was welfare maximizing for sup-
pliers. Preferences and access to markets jointly determined prices, welfare and market power.
Goods were exchanged at local prices that di¤ered from the competitive equilibrium price. Re-
sale at positive markups was common even in well connected economies, and was driven by the
arbitrage opportunities that the di¤erent prices in the economy o¤ered to traders. The monop-
sony wedges were the main force limiting intermediation in the model, as the cost of supplying
units was shown to increase along any supply chain. Although an explicit characterization of
market power remains desirable, it was not possible to deliver a tractable and general result
mainly due to the non-linearities in the complementarity problem characterizing the outow
equilibria.
3 Large Markets and E¢ ciency
This section analyzes pricing behavior in economies with a large number of traders, and presents
necessary and su¢ cient conditions on the network topology for outow equilibrium trades to
be approximately e¢ cient. To impose some discipline on the network structure as the number
of players diverges to innity, the analysis introduces the notion of community structure of a
trade network. A community will be dened as a complete subgraph in which all players share
the same neighbors. Any trade network will be represented by a corresponding network among
communities. The analysis xes the topology among communities and studies outow equilib-
rium behavior when communities are large. The aim of this exercise is to provide a tractable
model of market power distortions in large markets. Communities here will be interpreted
as cities to capture a distinctive feature of cities, namely that individuals of a given city are
10Despite the negative conclusions obtained in proposition 4, it would be interesting to argue that it is always
possible to add a link to any incomplete trade network that weakly increases either social or individual welfare.
If so, the complete network would be both welfare maximizing and pairwise stable. The proof of this conjecture
however, remains an open question.
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located in the same geographical position (and can thus freely trade with other inhabitants of
their city and with the same set of neighboring cities).
The rst result presents necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the existence of trade ows
among communities which are e¢ cient and direct (without resale). Such conditions follow from
an adaptation of Halls marriage theorem to our more complex environment.11 The analysis
proceeds to show that these conditions are both necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of an
e¢ cient outow equilibrium when the number of players in every community is large. When
all communities have comparable magnitudes, these conditions imply that intermediation must
be negligible for trade to be e¢ cient in every community. When communities have di¤erent
magnitudes approximate e¢ ciency only requires the absence of intermediation between any two
large communities. In such economies, trade in smaller communities may remain ine¢ cient
unless large communities can execute all of their trades. The section concludes with some
examples and by discussing the relationship between social welfare and market size.
Community Structure and Market Clearing
The notion of community structure of a network G is now introduced. A subset of players
C  V is said to be a community in G if: (i) Vi [ fig = Vj [ fjg for any two players i; j 2 C;
and (ii) Vi[fig 6= Vk[fkg for any player k 2 V nC. Thus, a community consists of a completely
connected subset of players who share the same players as neighbors.12 A community di¤ers
from a clique (a maximal complete subgraph) in that players share the same neighbors if they
belong to the same community, but not necessarily if they belong to the same clique. Denote
by C the set of communities of a network G. The set C uniquely partitions the vertices of the
original trade network into disjoint subsets of players. The community structure of a network
G is network G = (C;E) with communities as vertices C and with edges between any two
communities C;K 2 C dened so that CK 2 E if ij 2 E for some i 2 C and j 2 K.
The denition of community implies that, whenever two communities are linked, all of their
inhabitants can trade with each other. The rest of the analysis presents results in terms of
the community structure. The approach is without loss of generality, as there is a one-to-one
mapping between community structure and network structure.
To understand when intermediation is needed to clear markets at the e¢ cient allocation, it is
useful to understand some properties of the e¢ cient net-trade q. LetD = fi 2 V jqi > 0g denote
the set of players demanding consumption at the e¢ cient prole q, and let S = fi 2 V jqi < 0g
denote the set of players supplying consumption at q. Refer to players in D as buyers, and to
players in S as sellers. For any community C 2 C, denote by q+C =
P
i2C\D qi the aggregate
demand of that community, and denote by q C =
P
i2C\S qi its aggregate supply. The e¢ cient
11Halls marriage theorem provides conditions on a bipartite graph for the existence of a match that clears
the short side of the market (Bollobas 1998).
12The denition of community implies that Vi [ fig  C for any i 2 C.
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net-trade of any community can thus be dened as the di¤erence between these two quantities,
qC = q
+
C + q
 
C . For any subset of communities T  C, let VT denote the set of communities
that can trade with at least one community in T ,
VT = T [ fK 2 C j CK 2 E for some C 2 Tg ,
and dene the excess-supply and the excess-demand of group T respectively as
(T; q) =  PC2VT q C  PC2T q+C and
(T; q) =
P
C2VT q
+
C +
P
C2T q
 
C .
The excess-supply (excess-demand) amounts to the di¤erence between the aggregate supply
(demand) of communities who can directly sell to (buy from) communities in T and the aggre-
gate demand (supply) of communities in T . These denitions depend on the network structure
and on the notion of e¢ ciency, but not on any element of the outow competition setup. For
convenience, say that an economy meets condition MC (or market clearing) if any group of
communities faces a non-negative excess-supply.
Condition MC: Economy E satises MC if (T; q)  0 for any T  C.
A simple economy satisfying MC is one in which every seller is linked to every buyer. If so,
MC holds trivially as the aggregate excess supply equals zero by construction, (C; q) = 0.13
The next result generalizes Halls marriage theorem to our environment. It establishes that
condition MC is both necessary and su¢ cient for the existence of direct ows of consumption
from sellers to buyers that support an e¢ cient allocation q. The proposition also shows that MC
is equivalent to requiring any group of communities to face a non-negative excess-demand. The
result is related to Gale 1957, who studies the existence of market clearing ows in environments
in which intermediation is possible, and in which the capacity of every link is bounded.
Proposition 5 For any economy E the following three statements are equivalent:
(a) the economy satises MC;
(b) (T; q)  0 for any T  C;
(c) there exists q 2 RE+ such that:
qi = +
P
j2S\Vi q
j
i for any i 2 D, (i)
qi =  
P
j2D\Vi q
i
j for any i 2 S. (ii)
The third statement in the proposition amounts to the existence of consumption ows that clear
13As MC hinges on the denitions of D and S and in turn on the denition of e¢ ciency, some information
about preferences and technologies may be required to test whether MC holds when the network is incomplete.
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markets in environments in which intermediation is not feasible. E¢ cient and direct ows of
consumption exist if and only if any subset of communities can have its e¢ cient net-trade met
by those communities to which it is linked to.14 As in the marriage theorem, the more surprising
part of the result is that MC is su¢ cient for the existence of such ows of consumption, since
necessity obtains trivially. The existence of direct and e¢ cient consumption ows plays a
central role in the analysis of large markets, as results establish that intermediation necessarily
distorts trade.
Large Markets and Outow Competition E¢ ciency
The next results present su¢ cient conditions on community structure for the existence of an
approximately e¢ cient outow equilibrium when some communities are large. Large markets
are introduced by xing community structure and increasing the number of players in some
communities. The approach is convenient, as it a¤ects the extent of the competition in each
community without changing the overall topology among communities. When communities are
interpreted as cities and the community structure as the network of the feasible trades among
cities (where limitations arise either because of geography or because of trade barriers), the
analysis provides conditions on the economy for trade to be e¢ cient when some cities are large.
It is convenient to introduce the notion of a replica economy in the context of markets
in which a subset of communities is large and comparable in magnitude (cities), while the
remaining communities are small (villages). This approach is almost without loss of generality,
since conclusions on approximate e¢ ciency rely only on behavior in communities with the
largest magnitude. Fix a baseline economy E = fC;E;Q;ug, a number z 2 N+, and a subset
of communities C^  C.
Replica Economy: E(C^)z = fCz;Ez;Qz;uzg is a (C^;z)-replica economy of E if:
[R0] for any C 2 CnC^ there exists Cz = C;
[R1] for any C 2 C^ there exists Cz = fi:sji 2 C & s 2 f1; :::; zgg;
[R2] Cz = fCzjC 2 Cg & Ez = fCzKzjCK 2 Eg;
[R3] Qzi:s = Qi & u
z
i:s = ui for any i 2 V & s 2 f1; :::; zg.
The rst two conditions state that for any community in the baseline economy there is a
corresponding replicated community in its (C^;z)-replica. Replicated communities in C^ consist
of z copies of the players in the baseline community, while replicated communities not in C^
coincide with those in the baseline economy. The last two conditions in the denition instead
14In the context of Halls marriage theorem, condition MC simplies to having any group of players on one
side of the market linked to a group of players on the other side of the market which has at least its size. Even
in that environment the denition of MC relies both on the network structure and on the notion of e¢ ciency
(as a match between players on di¤erent sides of the market has value, whereas one between players on the
same side has none).
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require that community structure is not a¤ected by replication, and that all copies of a player
have the same capacity and preferences. While increasing competition within each community,
the notion of replica preserves the community structure in an economy and the composition of
players within each community (only increasing the number of players in some communities).
The concept of replica is introduced for sake of tractability, but any large market with a nite
number of communities populated by nitely many types of players can be approximated by a
replica economy.
A (C^;z)-replica is said to be balanced if C^ = C. Balanced replicas keep the relative size of
communities constant, and guarantee that all communities remain comparable in magnitude.
A convenient feature of balanced replication is that the e¢ cient net-trades of players coincide
in any replica of a baseline economy, as preferences are concave. Therefore, buyers (sellers) in
an economy remain buyers (sellers) in anyone of its replicas. In contrast, when replication is
not balanced C^ 6= C, e¢ cient net-trades may di¤er in any two replicas, since the composition
of players in the economy might be a¤ected by the replication process.
A sequence of replica economies
n
E(C^)z
o1
z=1
is said to converge to e¢ ciency, if there exists
a sequence of outow equilibria in which net-trades converge pointwise to the e¢ cient net-
trades for every player in every community. Similarly, a sequence of replica economies is said
to converge to approximate e¢ ciency, if there exists a sequence of outow equilibria in which
net-trades converge pointwise to the e¢ cient net-trades for every player in any community
belonging to C^. The notion of approximate e¢ ciency is introduced as the surplus of any small
community is negligible compared to aggregate surplus in any large replica economy.
Begin by considering balanced replication. Proposition 6 is central to the analysis, and
shows that condition MC is both necessary and su¢ cient for outow equilibrium net-trades to
converge to e¢ ciency when all communities have comparable magnitudes. Furthermore, trade
converges to e¢ ciency only if no player resells consumption in the limiting economy.
Proposition 6 If A1 holds, a sequence of balanced replica economies converges to e¢ ciency:
(a) only if no individual resells consumption in the limiting economy;
(b) if and only if MC holds in the baseline economy E.
Intermediaries command a rent that distorts trade in markets of any size. When each local
market becomes more competitive, players become price takers as sellers, but never as buyers
since they retain local monopsony power when purchasing goods. The wedge on inow prices
cannot disappear for intermediaries mediating a non-negligible ow of consumption, as their
trading decisions a¤ect the allocation of consumption in the economy and consequently welfare.
Thus, large economies failing condition MC never converge to e¢ ciency, as players acting as
intermediaries would necessarily command a rent if they were required to mediate trade. In the
outow model, intermediaries retain market power whenever their aggregate supply decisions
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a¤ect feasible outcomes. If instead MC holds, competition among sellers in large communities
eliminates rents on all trades and thus any motive for resale. If so, intermediation vanishes,
outow equilibrium net-trades converge to e¢ ciency, and a unique price reigns in the limiting
economy. The result views anonymous centralized Walrasian markets as approximations of non-
anonymous decentralized markets in which a large number of buyers and sellers can directly
trade with each other (as would be the case in an economy in which every community with a
non-negligible aggregate demand is able trade with every other community with a non-negligible
aggregate supply). A convenient feature of the proposed balanced replication process is that
MC can be imposed directly on the baseline economy rather than on the entire sequence of
replicas. A testable implication of the outow model is that resale markups are strictly positive
even in large markets. In contrast, most price-competition models predict that intermediaries
never command rent when more than one supply chain exists (Choi, Galeotti and Goyal 2014).
Next consider unbalanced replication. To guarantee that the e¢ cient net-trades remain
bounded when an unbalanced replica grows large, an additional technical assumption has to be
imposed on preferences.
Assumption A3 For any player i 2 V , the utility ui satises limq!1 u0i(q) = 0.
Denote by V^ = [C2C^C the set of players located in one of the large communities, and by V nV^
the set of players located in one of the small communities of a (C^; z)-replica. Let qz 2 RV+ denote
the e¢ cient net-trades of any type of player in a (C^;z)-replica, and let q1 = limz!1 qz. Such
net-trades coincide for all copies of a player-type due to concavity of preferences. The results
on unbalanced replication require further discipline on the community structure to guarantee
that net-trades converge to e¢ ciency in small communities. Consider the following additional
requirement.
Condition FC: A sequence of (C^;z)-replica economies satises FC if
(a) for any i 2 V nV^ such that q1i < 0, there exist j 2 V^ \ Vi;
(b) for any i 2 V nV^ such that q1i > 0, there exist j 2 V^ \ Vi such that q1j < 0.
The two conditions together imply that any small community requiring trade is linked to large
community; while the second further implies that sellers from some large community can supply
buyers living in a small community. Condition FC (or full clearing) may hold even if the baseline
economy violates MC.
For the economy E and the subset of communities C^, consider the large economy E+ =n
C^; E^;Q;u
o
obtained by deleting communities that do not belong to C^,
E^ =
n
CK 2 EjC;K 2 C^
o
.
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The next result generalizes Proposition 6 to unbalanced replication. It establishes that the
existence of e¢ cient and direct ows of consumption in E+ is necessary and su¢ cient for a
sequence unbalanced replicas to converge to approximate e¢ ciency. It also establishes that
net-trades converge to e¢ ciency in every communities when FC holds, as players in small
communities can access a large pool of buyers and sellers to meet their e¢ cient net-trades.
Proposition 7 If A1 and A3 hold, a sequence of replica economies converges to:
(a) approximate e¢ ciency if and only if MC holds in the large economy E+;
(b) e¢ ciency if and only if MC holds in E+ and FC holds for the sequence of replicas.
Whenever intermediation is not required to clear markets in large communities, equilibria that
converge to approximate e¢ ciency exist. In these equilibria, all goods are traded at a unique
price in every large community, and there are no distortions to pricing, as a large number of
sellers competes to supply any group of buyers belonging to C^.15 Prices, however, may di¤er
in small communities as market power and resale rents still distort trade in such locations. An
anonymous centralized market again approximates trading behavior in the large communities
of non-anonymous decentralized markets when intermediation is superuous. Condition FC
further implies that trade from the large communities can clear every local market and restore
full e¢ ciency. If so, intermediation and distortions vanish even in small markets as competition
from the larger communities disciplines prices by reducing rents on every trade. Convergence to
e¢ ciency would fail in smaller markets if FC were violated, as price distortions would necessarily
curtail trade in some small and poorly connected communities.
Other studies on two-sided networks and matching have exploited variants of condition MC
to clear markets and achieve e¢ ciency in decentralized markets without intermediation. Within
the outow competition framework, MC was proven to be necessary and su¢ cient for conver-
gence to e¢ ciency even in environments in which resale was feasible. Our observation di¤ers
from most other studies exploiting Hall theorem type arguments as necessity of MC is not built
in the trading environment by exogenous assumptions preventing resale. Results would extend
to more general replication processes in which all communities grow at possibly heterogeneous
rates. Convergence to approximate e¢ ciency in those environments would still require MC
holding among the largest communities. Conditions for convergence to full e¢ ciency would,
however, di¤er slightly, as communities that are neither large nor small could occasionally me-
diate trade between larger and smaller communities without creating frictions. The main aim
of the section was to provide simple conditions on the economy for trading behavior in large
decentralized oligopolistic markets to emulate behavior in large centralized competitive mar-
15A convenient feature of the proposed unbalanced replication process is that condition MC can imposed
directly in the large economy rather than on the entire sequence of replicas.
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kets. Sequences of replicas were only invoked here, as a parsimonious method to model large
decentralized markets in which locations are populated by nitely many types of traders.
Examples: Large Economies and Replication
Before proceeding to the nal results, consider three examples of replica economy. In each
example, the economy consists of three communities Ca, Cb, Cc. The preferences of all the
individuals in community Ci satisfy ui(q) = (Qi + q)1=2 for i 2 fa; b; cg, where Qa = 2, Qb = 1,
and Qc = 0. Community Ca is populated only by sellers, community Cc only by buyers, while
players in community Cb are neither sellers nor buyers. The rst two examples di¤er only
in the community structure, while the last two di¤er only in the replication process. Begin
by considering the economy in which the three communities are linked, and form a grand
community (depicted in the left plot of gure 2). The economy trivially satises condition MC,
and thus converges to e¢ ciency. As the economy becomes large, consumption in the sellers
community decreases monotonically, while consumption in the buyers community increases
monotonically. In the limit every player consumes one unit. The price paid by intermediaries
in community Cb converges from below to the competitive equilibrium price, 1=2; while the
price paid by buyers in the import community Cc monotonically decreases to the same value.
Intermediation by players in community Cb vanishes, and such players do not trade in the limit
economy. Per-capita social welfare increases monotonically as the economy grows large. The
two plots on the left in gure 3 depict consumption and prices in the unique equilibrium of this
sequence of replicas.
Figure 2: Community structure. Communities appear as linked circles.
Next consider the same economy, but suppose that sellers in community Ca cannot trade
directly with buyers in community Cc (depicted in the central plot of gure 2). If so, players
in community Cb act as middlemen buying from sellers in community Ca to supply buyers in
community Cc. The economy cannot satisfy condition MC, since no direct trade between sellers
and buyers is feasible. Thus, no sequence of outow equilibria can ever converge to e¢ ciency. In
fact, outow equilibrium consumption in the three communities does not converge. In the limit
economy, players in communities Ca and Cb consume more than players in community Cc. The
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price paid by middlemen in community Cb rst grows and then declines converging to a value
below the competitive equilibrium price. The price paid by buyers in community Cc instead,
monotonically decreases, but always remains above the competitive price. The limit markup
made by middlemen is approximately 30%. Per-capita social welfare increases monotonically
as the economy grows large, but remains ine¢ cient in the limit economy. The central plots in
gure 3 depict consumption and prices in the unique equilibrium of this sequence of replicas.
The outow model recognizes that the second community structure cannot attain e¢ ciency
while mimicking an anonymous Walrasian market, as some players in community Cb must
necessarily act as intermediaries while transferring a non-negligible amount of consumption
from sellers in Ca to buyers in Cc.
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Figure 3: In the top row consumption in communities a (top), b (middle), and c (bottom);
and in the bottom row prices in communities b (bottom), and c (top).
The nal example considers an unbalanced replica of the second community structure, in which
players in community Cb grow at a faster rate than other players in the economy (depicted in
the right plot of gure 2). In particular, the zth element of the unbalanced replica considered
here possesses z players in communities Ca and Cc, and z2 in community Cb. Any economy in
the sequence still violates condition MC, as no direct trade is feasible between the sellerscom-
munity and buyerscommunity. However, the unique symmetric equilibrium of this sequence
of unbalanced replicas also converges to e¢ ciency. Approximate e¢ ciency obtains, as only one
community is large in the limit and thus MC trivially holds in the large economy. Full e¢ -
ciency also obtains, since large communities can clear the aggregate demand and the aggregate
supply of any smaller community when the market is su¢ ciently large. The example highlights
22
why results on unbalanced replicas also apply to replication processes in which communities
grow at di¤erent rates, and why any intermediation has to take place in the large communities.
Consumption and prices for this sequence of replicas are shown in the right plots in gure 3.
Concluding Remarks on Balanced Replication
The analysis concludes with two additional observations on balanced replication: the rst
presents su¢ cient condition for symmetric equilibrium existence, while the latter relates welfare
to market size. For any sequence of symmetric equilibria of a replica, let qij = limz!1 zq
i:t
j:s(z)
denote the consumption sold in the limit economy by an individual of type i to all individuals
of type j. In a limiting symmetric equilibrium, optimality of ows requires
qij(u
0
j(qj)  u0i(qi) + u00i (qi)qi   i) = 0,
where i denotes the non-negative multiplier on the outow constraint, q
i
  Qi. Outow price
distortions vanish in any symmetric equilibrium when a large number of individuals competes
to supply each neighbor. The price distortions on inows, instead, persist for those individuals
who resell consumption. However, since the outow wedges were the complicating factor in the
proof of equilibrium existence, stronger results obtain.
Proposition 8 If A1 holds, the following three results follow:
(a) if MC holds, an e¢ cient outow equilibrium exists in the limit economy;
(b) if u000i  0 for any i 2 V , a symmetric outow equilibrium exists in the limit economy;
(c) if Vi  S for any i 2 D, a unique outow equilibrium exists in the limit economy.
In all the three cases, limiting revenues in each local market are concave. The result in (b)
holds since the costs of supplying outows are convex in the limit by the restriction on the third
derivative. Results in (a) and (c) follow because condition MC directly implies the existence
of an e¢ cient outow equilibrium in the limit economy. The strong conditions on the market
structure imposed in (c) further imply that all equilibria converge to e¢ ciency when all sellers
and buyers can directly trade.
Finally, Proposition 9 relates per-capita social welfare to market size and shows that welfare
increases monotonically as an economy gets replicated. Intuitively, the result obtains because,
by denition, a balanced replica increases competition uniformly at every location of the trade
network. Even economies failing MC become more competitive (though not perfectly compet-
itive) as the number of players grows large.
Proposition 9 If A1 holds and if any balanced replica possesses a unique symmetric equilib-
rium, then per-capita social welfare increases every time the economy is replicated.
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The proof of the proposition exploits the denition of balanced replica to establish a link
between social welfare and network structure by studying how changes in the number of players
at each location a¤ect the Jacobian matrix of the complementarity problem characterizing the
symmetric equilibria of a replica. Although the result o¤ers limited testable implications as it
holds only for balanced replication, it establishes an interesting property of such a process.
The aim of the section was to present conditions under which competition in decentralized
oligopolistic markets could mimic perfect competition. For this to be the case, trade had to be
direct in large communities and small communities had to be well connected. Economies, in
which intermediation (by buyers or by sellers) was necessary, would never approximate perfect
competition and e¢ ciency, as market power distortions would inevitably persist.
4 Inow Competition
This section shows why our conclusions are not specic to the outow model, by outlining
an alternative quantity competition model and comparing it to the outow model. The web-
appendix presents a more detailed discussion and examples. For sake of brevity, the analysis
assumes that players are constrained in the amount of units that they can purchase. Alternative
specications in which the supply side is constrained yield similar results.
Inow Competition: In the inow competition model, players simultaneously decide how
many units of consumption to buy from each of their neighbors (rather than deciding on how
many units to sell to their neighbors). Any player i is constrained not to buy more than Qi
units of consumption. Prices are determined at each location so that all units are sold at their
marginal cost. Thus, the price paid by Player i for units sold from a neighbor j is determined
by the inverse supply curve at node j,
pji (q) = pj(qj) = u
0
j(qj).
Players sell all of their goods at unique price which coincides with their marginal value of
consumption. Buyers expect such prices when choosing their demands. Assumption A1 again
implies that @pj(qj)=@q
j
i > 0 and @pj(qj)=@q
i
j < 0 for any i 2 Vj. The price earned by Player
j decreases when his inows increase, and increases when his outows increase. Again an
argument à la Kreps and Scheinkman could show how price competition among buyers would
lead to such prices if individuals had to commit to their inows.16 The problem of an individual
16Individuals o¤ering a lower price would be worse o¤since part of their demand would not be met. Individuals
o¤ering a higher price would be worse o¤ since their demand could be met at a lower price.
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i 2 V reduces to
max
qi2RVi+
ui(qi) +
P
j2Vi [pi(qi)q
i
j   pj(qj)qji ] s.t. qi  Qi.
If qji > 0 and q

i < Qi, optimality of the ow q
j
i requires that
pi(qi)  pj(qj) =  p0j(qj)qji   p0i(qi)qi.
The markup on the ow qji (the di¤erence between the buyers marginal value and the price
paid) is completely determined by two wedges: the monopoly price distortion on all units
sold, and the Cournot distortion on the units purchased from seller j. Optimality in the
inow model di¤ers from the outow model, as di¤erent distortions a¤ect equilibrium pricing.
Whereas suppliers were able to commit to their sales in the outow model, buyers are able to
commit to their purchases in the inow model. The ability to commit to trade ows benets
the players executing trades by allowing them to appropriate more gains from trade. Thus,
an inow economy is generally more e¢ cient than an outow economy, as more units ow to
individuals with a higher marginal value. The expression inow equilibrium is used to refer to
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the inow competition model.
Result Survey: Almost all of the results developed in the context of the outow model also,
apply to the inow model. Su¢ cient conditions for inow equilibrium existence di¤er slightly
from conditions imposed in the outow model, and are reported in the web-appendix. In the
inow model sellers supply all their customers at a single price. Buyers, however, often purchase
goods from di¤erent suppliers at di¤erent prices, as price distortions can increase their expendi-
ture when they concentrate their demand in a single market. As in the outow model, resale is
a common feature of equilibrium behavior, and linked individuals with di¤erent marginal rates
of substitution do not necessarily trade. Su¢ cient conditions for trade to take place between
pairs of linked individuals require gains from trade to exceed the outow price distortion of the
buyer. Examples in the web-appendix establish that adding links may still reduce welfare. Re-
sults on large markets are not a¤ected by the change in the pricing paradigm. Again, economies
in which intermediation cannot vanish never attain e¢ ciency, whereas economies satisfying the
condition MC do.
5 Comments
When can behavior in a decentralized oligopolistic market approximate perfect competition?
Providing a simple answer to this question was the main aim of the analysis. To this end, a
tractable model of oligopolistic competition in networked markets was introduced. Distinguish-
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ing features of the model were the option to resell goods and the endogenous identity of buyers
and sellers in the economy. Unsurprisingly, behavior in small markets could never approximate
perfect competition, as local market power would inevitably distort trade. However, behavior
in large decentralized markets was shown to approximate perfect competition whenever resale
was not required to clear large markets. In such scenarios, e¢ cient trades obtained in large
communities directly without recourse to intermediation; all units were sold at one price in
any large community; and intermediation persisted only to supply communities of negligible
size. Behavior in these smaller communities was shown to approach perfect competition only
when all of their trades could be executed in some large communities. The main implication
of the model is that perfectly competitive resale markets do not exist when local market power
constrains trade.
Strong assumptions on trade costs were implicit in the two quantity competition models
presented. Trade was assumed to be costless between pairs of linked individuals, but extremely
costly between any other pair of traders. Such restrictions were only imposed for the sake of
clarity. In fact, the model and its conclusions would easily extend to environments in which a
weighted network captures the heterogeneous trade costs between pairs of players. Assumptions
also required the marginal utility of consumption to be positive for any player in the economy.
The setup, however, can approximate environments in which intermediaries do not value con-
sumption, when the marginal utility of such players is su¢ ciently low. Other limitations of
the analysis were the omission of an explicit network formation model and the impossibility of
migration. Indeed, it would be interesting to know if migration would always lead to e¢ cient
community structures. But this question lies beyond the scope of this manuscript.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Begin by establishing existence. For every player i 2 V , the set of
feasible outows Xi =

qi 2 RVi jqi  Qi \ qij  0
	
is clearly non-empty, compact, convex.
Su¢ cient conditions for the best reply maps to be single-valued require: that for every player
i revenues from the sales to each neighbor j 2 Vi be concave in qij; that his costs of supplying
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units be convex in outows qi; and that one of the two conditions be strict. Revenues are
concave in each market, if for any ij 2 E
@2Rij(q
i
j;q
 i)=(@qij)
2 = 2u00j (qj) + q
i
ju
000
j (qj)  0. (E1)
Since qi is a linear function of every outow qij and since outows a¤ect costs only through
consumption qi, costs Ci(qi;q i) are a convex in the vector qi whenever Ci(qi;q i) is convex
in qi
@2Ci(q
i;q i)=(@qi)2 =  u00i (qi) + qi u000i (qi)  0. (E2)
Assumptions A1 and B1 imply that E1 and E2 hold, with at least one of the two holding
strictly. In particular, since by feasibility Qj + qj  qj  qij, A1 and the upperbound in B1
imply that revenues are concave since
2u00j (qj) + q
i
ju
000
j (qj)  (2u00j (qj) + (Qj + qj)u000j (qj))I(u000j (qj) > 0)  0,
where I() denotes the indicator function (I(A) = 1 if A is true, I(A) = 0 otherwise). Moreover,
since Qi + qi  qi , A1 and the lowerbound in B1 imply that costs are convex since
 u00i (qi) + qi u000i (qi)  ( u00i (qi) + (Qi + qi)u000i (qi))I(u000i (qi) < 0)  0.
Since both indicator maps cannot hold at once either revenues are strictly concave, or costs
are strictly convex. Thus, A1 and B1 imply that payo¤s are strictly concave and continuous
for each player. Strict concavity of payo¤s and the compactness and convexity of choice set Xi
require the best-response correspondences to be single-valued. Continuity of the payo¤s implies
(by Berges theorem of the maximum) that best responses are continuous. Thus, the existence
of outow equilibrium is guaranteed by Brouwers xed point theorem.
Next observe that su¢ cient conditions for best reply maps to be single-valued do not need
to discipline payo¤s when the revenues from selling units are decreasing. In fact, such outows
could never be a best reply for the player selling the units, as marginal costs are positive by
assumption A1. Thus, to grant existence it su¢ ces to show A1 and B2 imply that E1 and
E2 hold whenever revenues increase. The rest of the argument shows that A1 and B2 imply
that the revenue of Player i from sales to every neighbor j 2 Vi is concave in qij and that his
costs of supplying units are convex in qi, whenever the revenue from selling units to i increases.
Revenues in market i increase, if u0i(qi) + q
j
iu
00
i (qi)  0. If so,
Viu
0
i(qi) + q

i u
00
i (qi)  0.
where the implication holds by summing over all neighbors j. Thus, A1 and the lowerbound in
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B2 imply that costs are convex when revenues increase, since
 u00i (qi) + qi u000i (qi)  Viu0i(qi)

  u
00
i (qi)
u0i(qi)Vi
  u
000
i (qi)
u00i (qi)

I(u000i (qi) < 0)  0.
Similarly, observe that A1 and the upperbound in B2 imply that revenues are concave when
revenues increase, since
2u00j (qj) + q
i
ju
000
j (qj)   u0i(qi)

u000i (qi)
u00i (qi)
  2u
00
i (qi)
u0i(qi)

I(u000j (qj) > 0)  0.
As one of the two conditions on revenues and costs holds strictly, assumptionsA1 and B2 imply
that the payo¤ of each player is strictly concave and continuous whenever increasing. The
strict concavity of payo¤s and the compactness and convexity of the choice set correspondence
imply that the best-responses are single-valued. Again Brouwers xed point theorem applies
and implies existence. Also observe that any combination of the two assumptions B1 and B2
would similarly grant existence.
To prove the characterization nally observe that the rst part of the proof implies that
solutions can be found by Kuhn-Tucker rst order conditions. The optimality of a ow qij then
implies that
qij = 0 if u
0
i(qi)  u00i (qi)qi   u0j(qj) + i > 0
qij > 0 if u
0
i(qi)  u00i (qi)qi   u0j(qj)  u00j (qj)qij + i = 0
i  0, Qi   qi  0, and i(Qi   qi) = 0
which simply amounts to the complementarity problem stated in the result.
Proof of Proposition 3. (a) First order necessary conditions immediately establish the
result since qji > 0 implies
u0j(qj)  u0i(qi) = i   u00j (qj)qij   u00i (qi)qi > 0,
where i denotes the non-negative multiplier on the outow constraint, q
i
  Qi, and where
the latter terms are positive by assumption A1. Moreover, the converse clearly fails due to the
positive price distortions inherent to the model.
(b) Let T (q) = fij 2 Ejqij > 0g be the set of active trading links. If ij 2 T (q), by rst order
optimality u0i(qi) < u
0
j(qj). Thus if a cycle c = fij; jk; :::; lig 2 T (q), a contradiction arises
since u0i(qi) < u
0
j(qj) < u
0
k(qk) < ::: < u
0
l(ql) < u
0
i(qi).
(c) If for i 2 V and for any j 2 Vi equilibrium dictates that u0i(qi)  u0j(qj), then i cannot buy
from any neighbor, since u0i(qi) > u
0
j(qj) is necessary for q
j
i > 0. Similarly if u
0
i(qi)  u0j(qj) for
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any j 2 Vi, Player i cannot be selling to any neighbor, since u0i(qi) < u0j(qj) is necessary for
qij > 0.
(d) By part (c) if i is a source qi = 0. Which in turn implies that, if A1 holds, Player i sells to
any j 2 Vi with u0i(qi) < u0j(qj), provided that qi < Qi, since there exists qij > 0 for which
 u0i(qi) + u0j(qj) + qiju00j (qj) = 0.
(e) If A1 holds, optimality of the trade from k to i requires
u0k(qk)  u00k(qk)
P
l2Vk q
l
k + k = u
0
i(qi) + q
k
i u
00
i (qi) < u
0
i(qi) < u
0
j(qj)
which is both necessary and su¢ cient for a trade from k to j to occur.
Proof of Proposition 4. (a) A prole of ows q is e¢ cient if for any ij 2 E the ow qij
satises
[u0j(qj)  u0i(qi)  i]qij = 0 & [qi +Qi]i = 0, (2)
where i denotes the multiplier of the capacity constraint of Player i. Optimality conditions
for an outow equilibrium, instead, require that for any ij 2 E the ow qij satises
[u0j(qj)  u0i(qi)  i + u00j (qj)qij + u00i (qi)qi ]qij = 0 & [qi +Qi]i = 0, (3)
where i denotes the multiplier of the capacity constraint. If q = 0 is e¢ cient, it satises
condition (2). But then q = 0 is an outow equilibrium, as it immediately satises condition
(3). If, however, q 6= 0 is e¢ cient, then q cannot be an outow equilibrium, as condition (3)
and (2) coincide only if q = 0, since utility is concave by assumption A1.
(b) Consider a market with three consumers fa; b; cg. Let Qa = 2, Qb = 1, and Qc = 0, and
assume that the preferences of any player i satisfy ui(q) = (Qi + q)1=2. Increasing the set of
trading relationships from facg to fac; abg reduces social welfare. When only players a and c
are allowed to trade, Player a sells 0:4 units to c at a price of 0:8, and social welfare stands
at 2:9. When instead consumer a is allowed to trade with b as well as c, he elects to supply
both neighbors: b with 0:2 units and c with 0:36 units at di¤erent prices. Individual as price
discrimination of players b and c decreases sales to c. Player a curtails his supply to c in order
to extract higher marginal rents from c, since he is able to recoup the loss in revenue by selling
to b. Social welfare declines to 2:89. Flows, prices and quantities for the two economies are
reported in gure 4 (left and center) and table 2 (left and center).
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2
01
2
01
a
b c
2
01
a
b c
0.4 0.36 0.40.2 0.25
0.19
Figure 4: On the vertices endowments and identities and on the edges ows.
E1 p x w E2 p x w E3 p x w
a - 1.60 1.58 a - 1.44 1.59 a - 1.35 1.54
b - 1.00 1.00 b 0.46 1.20 1.00 b 0.49 1.06 1.03
c 0.79 0.40 0.32 c 0.83 0.36 0.30 c 0.65 0.59 0.39
+ - 3.00 2.90 + - 3.00 2.89 + - 3.00 2.96
Table 2: Prices, consumption & welfare: left facg , center fac; abg , right fac; ab; bcg .
(c) Consider an economy with four players fa; b; c; dg, with initial endowments f2:97; 1; 0; 0:03g,
and in which the preferences of any player satisfy ui(q) = (Qi + q)1=2. When the set of feasible
trades increases from fad; bcg to fad; bc; dcg, Player ds welfare decreases. If only trades in
fad; bcg are feasible, in the unique equilibrium of this economy players a and b supply their
respective customers as monopolies.
2.97
1
0.03
0
2.97
1
0.03
0
a
b c c
a d
b
d0.590.61
0.02
0.220.20
Figure 5: On the vertices endowments and identities and on the edges ows.
E1 p q w E2 p q w
a - 2.36 1.92 a - 2.38 1.93
b - 0.80 1.12 b - 0.78 1.11
c 1.12 0.20 0.22 c 1.02 0.24 0.24
d 0.63 0.64 0.42 d 0.65 0.60 0.41
+ - 4.00 3.68 + - 4.00 3.69
Table 3: Prices, consumption & welfare: left fad; bcg , right fad; dc; bcg .
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But when the link cd is added to the network, Player d competes with b to supply c. In the
unique equilibrium consumer d is worse o¤ than when he cannot sell to c, since his payo¤
decreases from 0:42 to 0:41. Even though Player d chooses to supply c, having the option to
sell a¤ects the quantity sold to him from a, and thus reduces his welfare. All gains from trade
on the newly created link are either kept by c or transferred to a. Player a being the monopoly
supplier of d is able to extract more rents, as he faces a steeper demand schedule whenever d
has the option to resell. Flows, allocations and prices for the two economies are reported in
table 3 and in gure 5.
Proof of Proposition 5. The rst step of the argument shows that (a) and (b) are equivalent.
If (H; q)  0 for 8H  C, it must be that for any T  C
(T; q) = (T; q)  (C; q) =  PC2CnVT q+C  PC2CnT q C =
= (CnVT ; q) 
P
C2(CnT )nVCnVT
q C  0,
where the rst equality holds since the e¢ cient net trades add to zero (C; q) = 0, and where
the second equality holds since CnT  VCnVT for 8T  C. Similarly if (H; q)  0 for
8H  C, then for any T  C
(T; q) = (CnVT ; q) +
P
C2(CnT )nVCnVT
q+C  0.
To prove the nal step it is convenient to map condition MC to the original network structure.
Let Di = D \ Vi, Si = S \ Vi, and SH = [i2HSi. First establish that MC holds if and only if
for any H  D
~(H; q)   Pj2SH qj  Pi2H qi  0.
For any H  D, let T (H) = fC 2 C j C \H 6= ;g. If MC holds, observe that for any H  D
~(H; q)   PC2VT (H)Pi2C\S qi  PC2T (H)Pi2C\D qi = (T (H); q)  0,
where the rst inequality holds as T (H) may include more buyers than H. Similarly, for any
T  C, let H(T ) = fi 2 D j i 2 C for C 2 Tg. If ~(H; q)  0 for any H  D, MC holds as
for any T  C,
(T; q) =  PC2VT Pi2C\S qi  Pi2H(T ) qi = ~(H(T ); q)  0,
where the rst inequality holds as i 2 SH(T ) if and only if i 2 C \ S for some C 2 VT .
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The next step exploits the previous simplication to establish that (c) implies (a) by con-
tradiction. Observe that whenever (ii) holds for any H  D
 Pi2SH qi = Pi2SHPj2Di qij Pi2SHPj2H\Di qij = Pj2HPi2Sj qij,
where rst equality holds by (ii) and the last holds since any pair of players i; j that satises
j 2 H and i 2 Sj, also satises i 2 SH and j 2 H \Di. If MC were violated, ~(H; q) < 0 for
some H  D. But if so, the previous observation would imply that (i) would also be violated
for some player j 2 H since
 Pj2H qj +Pj2HPi2Sj qij   Pj2H qj  Pi2SH qi = ~(H; q) < 0.
The nal step proves that ~(H; q)  0 for any H  D implies (c) by induction on D. First
establish that the result holds for jDj = 1. Let i denote the only buyer in the economy. By
assumption we have that ~(D; q)  0, which in turn implies that ~(D; q) = 0 as supply cannot
exceed aggregate demand by construction. Thus ows satisfying both (i) and (ii) can be found
by setting qji =  qj for any j 2 S = Si.
Next suppose that ~(H; q)  0 for any H  D is su¢ cient whenever jDj  m  1 to prove
that it is su¢ cient for jDj = m. Initially assume that H  D exists such that ~(H; q) = 0.
Consider the subgraph (V 0; E 0) with vertices V 0 = S 0 [ D0 with D0 = H and S 0 = SH , and
with edges restricted to E 0 = E \ fijji 2 S 0 \ j 2 D0g. This subgraph satises ~(K; q)  0 for
any K  D0 trivially, since no condition was altered. Thus, since jHj < m, by the induction
assumption it is possible to nd ows q 2 RE0+ such that (i) and (ii) hold in the subgraph,
qj =
P
i2Sj q
i
j for 8j 2 H,
qi =  
P
j2Di\H q
i
j for 8i 2 SH .
To conclude the proof it su¢ ces to show that, given such ows, the remaining players of the
original graph still satisfy MC. Denote by q^ 2 RV the e¢ cient net-trades q shifted by such
ows q. That is for any i 2 V , let
q^i = qi   qi + qi.
Consider the subgraph (V 00; E 00) with vertices V 00 = S 00 [D00 with D00 = DnH and S 00 = SnSH ,
and with edges restricted to E 00 = E \ fijji 2 S 00 \ j 2 D00g. For any K  DnH it must be
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that
~00(K; q^) = ~00(K; q^) + ~00(H; q^) +
P
i2SH\SK q^i =
= ~(K; q) Pi2SKPj2Di\H qij + ~(H; q) +Pi2SH\SK (qi +Pj2Di\H qij) =
= ~(K; q) + ~(H; q) +
P
i2SH\SK qi = ~(K [H; q)  0,
since ~00(H; q^) = ~(H; q) = 0 and
P
i2SH\SK q^i = 0. Which in turn implies by induction that
ows q00 2 RE00+ exist that satisfy condition (i) and (ii), since jDnHj < m.
Finally if ~(L; q) > 0 for any L  D, consider H 2 arg minLD ~(L; q) and choose any
prole of ows _q from SH to DnH such thatP
j2DnH
P
i2SH\Sj _q
i
j = ~(H; q).
Let q 2 RV denote the e¢ cient net-trades q adjusted for such ows _q. After such transfers,
~(H; q) = 0 and ~(L; q)  0 for any L  D, since
~(L; q)  ~(L; q)  ~(H; q)  0.
Thus, the q economy satises all the conditions required in the previous step of the proof and
MC is su¢ cient.
Proof of Proposition 6. (a) Let (V (z); E(z)) denote the trade network associated to commu-
nity structure (Cz;Ez). For convenience, occasionally denote ui(qi(z)) by ui(z). Whenever the
equilibrium of the replicas converges to e¢ ciency, it must be that limz!1(u0j(z) u0i(z)) = 0 for
any two players i; j 2 V (z) for which limz!1 qi(z) >  Qi and limz!1 qj(z) >  Qj. Suppose
by contradiction that some player i 2 V (z) resells units in the limit economy,
limz!1 ri(z) = limz!1min

qi (z); q
i
(z)
	
> 0.
If so, optimality of ows from i to his neighbors j 2 Vi(z) requires that, when qij(z) > 0,
limz!1(u0j(z)  u0i(z)) = limz!1
 
i(z)  u00i (z)qi (z)  u00j (z)qij(z)

> 0,
where i(z) denotes the non-negative multiplier on the outow constraint, q
i
(z)  Qi. Which
contradicts the assumption that the economy becomes competitive.
(b) First the necessity of MC is proven. MC holds in economy E if and only if MC holds in
any of its replicas Ez. If MC did not hold, by Proposition 5, no direct ows would exist from
seller to buyers that support the e¢ cient net-trades in the original economy. Resale among
players would thus be necessary for the e¢ cient net-trades to be an outcome of such economy.
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Dene the minimal resale in the (C; z)-replica economy as
r(z) = min
q2RE(z)+
maxi2V (z) ri(z) s.t. (i) and (ii) on page 17.
MC fails if and only if r(1) > 0. The denition of replica implies r(1) = r(z), because mini-
mizing the maximum resale requires all players of the same type to buy and sell the identical
amounts. This is the case, since the average ows across any two player types in a replica
(that is
Pz
s=1
Pz
t=1 q
i:s
j:t=z
2) dene ows in the original economy in which resale exceeds r(1)
(by e¢ ciency), which in turn implies that r(1)  r(z), as the average resale of a player of type
i cannot exceed the maximal resale of a player of type i. Thus, if r(1) > 0, any prole of ows
leading to the e¢ cient allocation requires at least one player to resell a positive amount of
goods in the limit economy. But, by part (a) no such outcome can be supported in an e¢ cient
limiting outow equilibrium as there is no resale in any such equilibrium.
The next part of the proof establishes that MC is su¢ cient for the existence of an e¢ cient
symmetric outow equilibrium in the limit economy. First observe that the solution of the
complementarity problem dening the symmetric equilibrium ows is lower hemi-continuous
in the replica counter z, as each optimality condition dening the problem is continuous and
di¤erentiable in 1=z, (see problem 4 in the proof of Proposition 9). Therefore, consider ows in
the original economy q 2 RE+ satisfying (i) and (ii) in Proposition 5. Such ow exist because MC
holds. If so, qi = qi for any player i 2 V . Dene the sequence of ows q(z) 2 RE(z)+ as follows:
qi:sj:t(z) = q
i
j=z for any (i:s)(j:t) 2 E(z), and qi:sj:t(z) = 0 otherwise. Such ows are direct and
satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) in the replica. Moreover, limz!1 qi:sj:t(z) = 0. Thus, limz!1 q(z)
satises all the outow equilibrium requirements in the limit economy. In particular, if such
ows were chosen by others, no player would be able to protably a¤ect the prices of the goods
sold in the limit, as deviations on his behalf could only reduce prices since limz!1 qi:sj:t(z) = 0.
As gains from deviating from q(z) decrease along the sequence of replicas and vanish in the
limit, the limit of q(z) is e¢ cient, and belongs to the limit of the symmetric outow equilibrium
correspondence. Lower hemi-continuity of the equilibrium correspondence then guarantees the
existence of a selection of equilibrium correspondence that converges to such a limit point. A
direct proof of the nal argument is possible, but more involved.
Proof of Proposition 7. (a) The proof of the result emulates part (b) of Proposition 6.
Let

V^ ; E^

denote the trade network associated to community structure (C^; E^). Let V^ (z) =
[C2C^Cz denote the set of players located in a large community of the (C^; z)-replica. To
establish the necessity of MC holding in the economy E+ observe that if MC were not hold,
by Proposition 5, no direct ows would exist from seller to buyers that support the e¢ cient
net-trades in E+. If so, resale among players in V^ would required for the e¢ cient net-trades
to be an outcome of the economy. Let q^ 2 RV^ denote the prole of e¢ cient net-trades in
36
the economy E+, and let qz 2 RV (z) denote the prole of e¢ cient net-trades in the economy
E(C^)z. Such proles exist by assumption A1. Observe that limz!1 qzi:s = q^i for any i 2 V^
and any s 2 f1; :::; zg, as net-trades of players in V nV^ = V (z)nV^ (z) become negligible when
the economy E(C^)z is large. This is the case since the e¢ cient allocation of consumption is
independent of
P
i2V nV^ q
z
i when z is su¢ ciently large given that: assumption A3 implies that
limz!1 qzi < 1 for any i 2 V nV^ ; the constraint on sales implies limz!1 qzi   Qi; and the
set V (z)nV^ (z) contains a nite number of players. Moreover, since the total number of units
sold by players in V (z)nV^ (z) cannot exceedPi2V nV^ Qi, resale among players in V^ (z) is always
required to achieve the e¢ cient net-trades when condition MC fails in the economy E+. If so,
the argument developed in Proposition 6 applies, and establishes that any outow equilibrium
must be ine¢ cient since at least a player in V^ (z) resells non-negligible amount of consumption
in any given prole of ows that gives rise to the e¢ cient net-trades.
The next part of the argument establishes why MC is su¢ cient for convergence to ap-
proximate e¢ ciency. Observe that the solution of the complementarity problem dening the
symmetric equilibrium ows is lower hemi-continuous in the replica counter z, as each optimal-
ity condition dening the problem is continuous and di¤erentiable in z. In particular, optimality
of a ow qi:sj:t(z) = q
i
j > 0 in a symmetric equilibrium of a (C^; z)-replica requires that
u0i(qi)  u0j(qj)  u00j (qj)qij   u00i (qi)qi + i = 0,
where i denotes the multiplier on the capacity constraint and where
qi = z
P
k2Vi\V^
 
qki   qik

+
P
k2VinV^
 
qki   qik

,
qi = z
P
k2Vi\V^ q
k
i +
P
k2VinV^ q
k
i .
This establishes the lower hemi-continuity in z of the complementarity problem dening the
symmetric outow equilibria, as each optimality condition dening the problem is continuous
and di¤erentiable in z.
Now construct candidate ows that converge to approximate e¢ ciency. For the economy
E+, let ~q 2 RE^+ denote a prole of ows satisfying (i) and (ii) in Proposition 5. Such ows
exist because MC holds, and satisfy
P
j2V^i(~q
j
i   ~qij) = q^i for any player i 2 V^ . Consider the
sequence of ows q(z) 2 RE(z)+ obtained by setting qi:sj:t(z) = ~qij=z for any (i:s); (j:t) 2 V^ (z),
while setting the remaining ows qij(z) according to their respective symmetric equilibrium
optimality conditions (dened above). Observe that by construction for any player in i 2 V^ (z),
qi(z) = q^i +
P
k2VinV^
 
qki (z)  qik(z)

.
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Consider any player k 2 Vi(z)nV^ (z), observe that i 2 Vk(z) \ V^ (z), if so limz!1 qki (z) = 0 or
else the capacity constraint of Player k would be violated. Similarly, limz!1 qik(z) = 0, or else
qk(z) would diverge to innity, which is impossible as Player i 2 Vk(z) \ V^ (z) would not be
choosing his ow to k optimally because qik(z) > 0 is equivalent to u
0
i(qi(z)) < u
0
k(qk(z)) (which
cannot hold in the limit as A1 implies u0i(qi(z)) > 0, while A3 that limz!1 u
0
k(qk(z)) = 0). This
establishes that ows q(z) converge to approximate e¢ ciency as limz!1 qi(z) = q^i = q1i .
The proof concludes by establishing that ows q(z) must be arbitrarily close to symmet-
ric equilibrium ows in the limit as z diverges. To verify that ows qi:sj:t(z) = ~q
i
j=z for any
(i:s); (j:t) 2 V^ (z) are arbitrarily close to equilibrium ows as z diverges, observe that the
conjectured ows satisfy limz!1 qi:sj:t(z) = 0. Therefore, limz!1 q(z) satises all the outow
equilibrium requirements for trades on links ij 2 E^ in the limit economy. In particular, if such
ows were chosen by others, no player would be able to protably a¤ect the prices of the goods
sold in the limit, as deviations on his behalf could only reduce prices since limz!1 qi:sj:t(z) = 0.
Since gains from deviating from q(z) decrease along the sequence of replicas and vanish in the
limit, the limit of q(z) is approximately e¢ cient and belongs to the limit of the symmetric
outow equilibrium correspondence. Lower hemi-continuity of the equilibrium correspondence
then guarantees the existence of a selection of equilibrium correspondence that converges to
such a limit point.
(b) Necessity of FC is immediate from part (a) and the following considerations. If FC were
violated, convergence to e¢ ciency in small communities would require trade across and/or
within small communities, or trade between buyers in small communities and buyers in large
communities. Either scenario would necessarily result in distortions. In the rst scenario
distortions would be a trivial consequence of Proposition 3, while the second distortions would
appear as inow price distortions would never vanish for players purchasing units in the limit
economy.
The next part of the proof establishes why MC and FC are su¢ cient for convergence to
e¢ ciency. Recall that I() denotes the indicator function. Consider the sequence of ows
q(z) 2 RE(z)+ obtained by setting for any ij 2 E(z)
qi:sj:t(z) =
8>>><>>>:
~qij
z
if (i:s); (j:t) 2 V^ (z)
  q1i I(q1i <0)
zjVi\V^ j if i:s 2 V (z)nV^ (z) and j:t 2 V^ (z)
q1j I(q
1
i >0)
zjVj\V^ \Sj if j:t 2 V (z)nV^ (z) and i:s 2 V^ (z)
while setting the remaining ows qi:sj:t(z) to zero. The proposed ows converge to e¢ ciency since
for any player in i 2 V^ (z) by construction it must be that
lim
z!1
qi(z) = q^i + lim
z!1
P
k2VinV^
 
qki (z)  qik(z)

= q1i ,
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while qi(z) = q1i for players i 2 V (z)nV^ (z). The proposed ows q(z) must be arbitrarily close
to symmetric equilibrium ows in the limit as z diverges. This is the case because conjectured
ows q(z) satisfy limz!1 qi:sj:t(z) = 0. Again limz!1 q(z) satises all the outow equilibrium
requirements for trades on all links in the limit economy. If such ows were chosen by others, no
player would be able to protably a¤ect the prices of the goods sold in the limit, as deviations
on his behalf could only reduce prices by limz!1 qi:sj:t(z) = 0, and because no player resells a
non-negligible amount of consumption. As gains from deviating from q(z) again decrease along
the sequence of replicas and vanish in the limit, the limit of q(z) is approximately e¢ cient and
belongs to the limit of the symmetric equilibrium correspondence. Lower hemi-continuity again
guarantees the existence of a selection of equilibrium correspondence that converges to such a
limit point.
Proof of Proposition 8. (a) This is a consequence of vanishing price distortions in any
e¢ cient limiting economy (which requires concave revenues and convex costs) and of Proposition
6 (which shows that MC implies that a limiting outcomes can be e¢ cient).
(b) Since in any symmetric equilibrium of the limiting economy the outow wedges vanish,
revenues in each market are concave. Since the third derivative is positive, costs of supplying
units are convex. Thus existence of a symmetric equilibrium in the limit economy follows as in
Proposition 1.
(c) Let i:s 2 arg minj:t2V (z) u0j:t(qj:t(z)). If q 6= 0, for any sequence of outow equilibrium
ows q(z) 2 RE(z)+ it must be that i:s 2 S(z), because such a player does not purchase
consumption by part (b) of Proposition 3, and because by denition of competitive equilibrium
0  qi:s(z)  qi. By contradiction suppose that there exists a sequence of outow equilibria that
does not converge to e¢ ciency. If so, the set of players linked to i:s and with marginal utility
strictly higher than i:s diverges, since Vj(z)  S(z) for 8j 2 D(z) implies Vj(z)  D(z) for 8j 2
S(z), and since limz!1 jD(z)j = limz!1 z jDj = 1. This immediately yields a contradiction
if limz!1 (qi:s(z)) >  Qi, because Qi < 1 and because by part (c) of Proposition 3 Player
i:s would sell a strictly positive amount of consumption in the limit to all his neighbors with
strictly higher marginal utility.
If, instead, limz!1 (qi:s(z)) =  Qi, let V+(z) = fk 2 V (z)jqk(z) >  Qkg and let i:s 2
arg minj:t2V+(z) u
0
j:t(qj:t(z)). First notice that limz!1 jV+(z)j =1, since limz!1 z
P
i2V Qi =1
and since u00 < 0. Thus, no player in V nV+(z) sells to i:s for z large enough, since a large and
diverging number players have strictly higher marginal utility than i:s, if q 6= 0. Hence, in the
limit i:s does not buy. If i:s 2 S(z) for z large, assuming that the sequence of outow equilibria
does not converge e¢ ciency again yields a contradiction. In fact, part (c) of Proposition 3 would
imply that Player i:s sells a strictly positive amount of goods in the limit to all his neighbors
with strictly higher marginal utility which is impossible since limz!1 (qi:s(z)) >  Qk, since
Qi < 1, and because i:s has innitely many neighbors with higher marginal utility in the
39
limit economy. A contradiction arises even if i:s 2 D(z) for z large and if the sequence of
outow equilibria does not converge to e¢ ciency. In particular if i:s 2 D(z) for z large enough,
it must be that qi > 0  limz!1 qi:s(z), since i:s only sells for z large enough. Moreover, by
denition of i:s it must be that, for any j:t 2 V+(z),
u0i:s(qi) < u
0
i:s(qi:s(z))  u0j:t(qj:t(z)),
which in turn by concavity implies that qj > qj:t(z) for any j:t 2 V+(z). Also, notice that
qj  qj:t(z) = 0 for any j:t 2 V nV+(z). Hence, provided that q 6= 0, contradiction arises, since
0 =
P
j:t2V (z) qj:t >
P
j:t2V (z) qj:t(z).
Thus the limit outow equilibrium must be e¢ cient.
Proof of Proposition 9. Dene the total quantity sold from an individual of type i to all
individuals of type j in the unique symmetric equilibrium of a (C; z)-replica by qij = zq
i
j(z).
The inequalities dening the symmetric equilibrium of a replica (a complementarity problem)
can be written in terms of such quantities as follows
f ij(q;jz) = u0i(qi)  u0j(qj)  u00j (qj)(qij=z)  u00i (qi)
P
k2Vi q
k
i + i  0, (4)
fi(q;jz) = Qi  qi  0,
where f ijq
i
j = 0 and fii = 0. Let f(q;jz) denote such complementarity problem. Dene the
set active constraints at the equilibrium of the replica by
T (q;jz) = ij2Ejqij > 0	 [ fi 2 V ji > 0g .
Let fT (q;jz) denote the complementarity problem obtained by restricting attention to the
active constraints. By assumption any replica economy possesses a unique equilibrium and
conditions for existence are met. Thus, the Jacobian of the problem must be positive denite
at the unique solution (Kolstad and Mathiensen 1987),
JT (q;jz) = rfT (q;jz) > 0,
where only the principal minor of Jacobian associated the active constraints has to be con-
sidered. The implicit function theorem then implies that at the unique equilibrium of the
problem
@fT
@q
@q
@z
+
@fT
@
@
@z
+
@fT
@z
= 0 ) @(q;)T
@z
=  JT (q;jz) 1@fT
@z
,
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where the denition of the complementarity problem requires that
@f ij(q;jz)
@z
=
u00j (qj)q
i
j
z2
and
@fi(q;jz)
@z
= 0.
Let L(qjz) = ij2Ejqij > 0	 denote the set of active ows. Dene: JL(q;jz) 1 to be the
leading minor of JT (q;jz) 1 associated with indexes in L(qjz); x =

u00j (qj)q
i
j
	
ij2L; and
Z =

zijkl
	
ij;kl2L as follows
zijkl =
8><>:
1=z if ij = kl
1 if j = k \qij > 0
0 if otherwise
.
For such notation, one gets that
Zx =

u00j (qj)(q
i
j=z) + u
00
i (qi)
P
k2Vi q
k
i
	
ij2L ,
@q
@z
=  (1=z2)JL(q;jz) 1x,
where the second equality obtains, as the the replica counter never appears in an outow
constraint. The matrix Z is positive denite because, for an appropriately chosen order of
links, it is lower triangular (as goods do not cycle), and because all elements on the main
diagonal are positive. Di¤erentiating per-capita social welfare with respect to z one gets that
@
@z

1
V
P
i2V ui(qi)

=
1
V
P
ij2E(u
0
j(qj)  u0i(qi))(@qij=@z) =
=   1
V
P
ij2E
 
u00j (qj)(q
i
j=z) + u
00
i (qi)
P
k2Vi q
k
i

(@qij=@z) =
=   1
V
x0Z0
@q
@z
=
1
V z2
x0Z0JL(q;jz) 1x  0.
The last expression is positive since it is a bilinear form and because both Z0 and JL(q;jz)
are positive denite. In fact, because both are positive denite, consider the positive denite
square root H of JL(q;jz) 1 (i.e. JL(q;jz)HH = I). Then Z0JL(q;jz) 1 = H 1(HZ0H)H.
Therefore Z0JL(q;jz) 1 and HZ0H have the same eigenvalues. Since HZ0H = H 0Z0H, such
matrix is positive denite and thus has only non-negative eigenvalues. The third equality uses
the observation that @qij=@z 6= 0 implies that the rst order condition must hold with equality.
In fact, if @qij=@z < 0, then q
i
 < Qi clearly holds and q
i
j > 0 or else q
i
j could not decrease in
equilibrium. If @qij=@z > 0 instead, then q
i
j > 0 clearly holds and q
i
 < Qi or else q
i
j could not
increase in equilibrium.
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